William H. Calvin, "The more serious failure," Washington Post letters column (Sunday, 23 September 2001). See also http://WilliamCalvin.com/2001/WashPostLtr.htm.
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Webbed Reprint Collection William H. Calvin
University of Washington
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This is the original version (op-ed length) of what was shortened and appeared as a letter in the Washington Post.
Tom
Friedman says the intelligence community might be forgiven for not having
imagined the events of September 11, but I think that applies only to imagining
the whole audacious chain: suicidal-but-competent
pilots, various teams of them living openly in the U.S., then all breezing
through airport security the same morning.
Certainly there should have been no difficulty in imagining the links of
the deadly chain. Indeed, the word
Assassins refers to a thousand-year-long tradition that included similar
self-sacrificing terrorist acts in the Middle East.
Israel has recently suffered much from suicide bombers.
The kamikaze pilots even used their airplane fuel as a bomb.
And we had lots of warning that, for anything except handguns and obvious
bombs, domestic airport security was a joke.
One government study after another said it was a disaster waiting to
happen. There was a gaping “hole
in the fence,” and we should not be surprised that someone finally drove a
truck through it.
It was obvious to any causal traveler to Europe that airport security was
taken seriously there, done by pros rather than by a constant turnover of the
poorly trained and poorly paid. It
certainly should have been obvious to any congressman or airline executive.
They are the ones who have so obviously failed us, trying to do airport
security on the cheap in the face of evidence for how to do the job right.
Congress will try to put the responsibility off onto the intelligence
community, but we should not forget what some peoples’ passion for
irresponsibly cheap government has cost us.
Furthermore, the European system (largely copied from Israel’s
thirty-year-old system) would likely have caught some of the assassins of
September 11. While European
airport security uses technology, its hallmark is interviewing passengers, not
just two standard questions at the ticket counter but repeated conversations
when passengers first enter the airport, while they stand in line, at the
security barrier, and again while in the boarding area.
The people who do the interviewing are smarter than most of the people
they interview, and they have been well-trained.
I cannot imagine that all 19 hijackers were free of stage fright;
interviewing would likely have suggested that something was up and spread an
alarm that closed down airports. So
ours was not a beginner’s mistake but a sloppy practice by international
standards that was never cleaned up by those we trusted.
Since
a lot of American airline personnel are going to be laid off by the reduced air
travel, we might quickly upgrade our airport security system to approximate that
of Europe by retraining them and paying realistic wages.
My impression is that many of the European interviewers are retrained
airline personnel such as ticket agents, already experienced in talking with
harried passengers.
While the master assassins of September 11 may well switch tactics next
time (a far larger problem), now that there has been a proof of concept we will
have to suffer with copycats, just as a well-publicized suicide may lead to a
new rash of bridge jumpers. Technology
alone will not identify these copycats.
William
H. Calvin
Seattle
Shortened version which appeared as a letter:
Sunday, September 23, 2001; Page B06
One government study after another said our airport security was a disaster
waiting to happen. Our lax security was not a beginner's mistake but sloppy
practice. In Europe, airport security has been taken much more seriously. The system
there (largely copied from Israel's) probably would have caught some of the
Sept. 11 assassins. While the European system uses technology, its hallmark is
interviewing passengers, and not just two standard questions at the ticket
counter but repeated conversations with passengers when they first enter the
airport, while they stand in line at the security barrier and again in the
boarding area. The people who do the interviewing have been well-trained. I cannot imagine that all 19 hijackers were free of stage fright;
interviewing them could have suggested that something was up and spread an alarm
that closed down airports. Since a lot of American airline personnel are going
to be laid off by the reduced air travel, we might quickly upgrade our airport
security system to approximate that of Europe by retraining them to be
interviewers. WILLIAM H. CALVIN Seattle From the FAA report on the year 2000 (at http://cas.faa.gov/crimacts/pdf/crim2000.pdf): During the past few years, the relatively low number of
incidents that were recorded may have been interpreted as an indication that the
threat to civil aviation was decreasing. The fact that the number of
aviation-related incidents in 2000 increased by 75% proves such an
interpretation to be premature. To be sure, the threat to civil aviation has not
significantly decreased. In addition to the ever-present threat of a terrorist
hijacking or bombing, an individual who hijacks a plane to seek asylum, a
guerrilla group that attacks an airport, or a terrorist group that bombs an
airline ticket office, constitutes a threat as well. The increase in the number
of incidents in 2000 attests to the fact that civil aviation continues to be a
target of terrorists and non-terrorists alike. Although there were no watershed terrorist incidents in 2000,
such as the 1988 bombing of Pan Am 103, the terrorist threat remains. The most
recent significant aviation-related terrorist action was the December 1999
hijacking of an Indian Airlines plane by members of a Kashmiri separatist group.
There continues to be concern that the hijacking may either be copied or spur
others to commit acts, because this incident succeeded in gaining the release of
prisoners and the hijackers have never been caught. Another threat is attributed
to terrorist financier Usama Bin Laden, who has been indicted for the August
1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Although Bin Laden is
not known to have attacked civil aviation, he has both the motivation and the
wherewithal to do so. Bin Laden’s anti-Western and anti-American attitudes
make him and his followers a significant threat to civil aviation, particularly
to U.S. civil aviation. Finally, another example that the terrorist threat has
not diminished is the plot by convicted World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef
of several years ago. In 1994, Yousef masterminded a conspiracy to place
explosive devices on as many as 12 U.S. airliners flying out of the Far East. In
December 1994, as a test for his more elaborate scheme, Yousef placed and
exploded a device on a Philippine Airlines plane killing one person. Although
Yousef is currently in prison, at least one other accused participant in the
conspiracy remains at large. There are concerns that this individual or others
of Yousef’s ilk who may possess similar skills pose a continuing threat to
civil aviation interests. There is every reason to believe that civil aviation will
continue to be an attractive target for terrorist groups. The publicity and fear
generated by a terrorist hijacking or bombing of an aircraft can be a powerful
attraction to a group seeking to make a statement or promote a particular
cause....
